Iot Conference Berlin M2M,IoT, device management: one protocol to rule them all?
•
21 j'aime•10,898 vues
M2M/IoT is rapidly growing and since its early days different “standard” protocols have emerged (e.g. OMA-DM, TR-069, MQTT, …) or are emerging (e.g. CoAP or Lightweight M2M). Understanding which protocol to use for which application can be intimidating, therefore we propose to give an overview of these protocols to help you understand their goals and characteristics. We’ll present common M2M use cases and why they usually require more than just one protocol ; we will also see whether CoAP associated with Lightweight M2M allows to forge “one protocol to rule them all”.
Recommandé
Recommandé
Contenu connexe
Tendances
Tendances (20)
Similaire à Iot Conference Berlin M2M,IoT, device management: one protocol to rule them all?
Similaire à Iot Conference Berlin M2M,IoT, device management: one protocol to rule them all? (20)
Dernier
Dernier (17)
Iot Conference Berlin M2M,IoT, device management: one protocol to rule them all?
- 1. M2M,IoT, device management: one protocol to rule them all? Julien Vermillard - Sierra Wireless
- 2. Who am I? Software Engineer at Sierra Wireless, implementing various protocols for AirVantage cloud service Apache member, Eclipse IoT committer Californium, Wakaama, Leshan open-source Lightweight M2M server Tinkerer: electronics, reversing, Linux
- 4. Agenda M2M/IoT application protocols (XMPP, MQTT) Web-of-things (CoAP) IoT protocol security Device management (TR-069, OMA-DM, OMA-LwM2M) Impact on IoT architectures
- 5. Let’s start with.. QUESTIONS!
- 8. Questions Know or use CoAP?
- 9. Questions Device management: OMA-DM, Lightweight M2M or TR-069?
- 10. Application protocols XMPP MQTT CoAP
- 11. XMPP Chat protocol based on XML recycled for IoT XEP-0322 (PDF) Efficient XML Interchange (EXI) Format Standards - 2014-03-10 XEP-0323 (PDF) Internet of Things - Sensor Data - Experimental - 2014-04-07 XEP-0324 (PDF) Internet of Things - Provisioning - Experimental - 2014-05-21 XEP-0325 (PDF) Internet of Things - Control -Experimental 2014-04-07 XEP-0326 (PDF) Internet of Things - Concentrators - Experimental 2014-03-10
- 12. XMPP <message from='device@clayster.com' to='client@clayster.com/amr'> <fields xmlns='urn:xmpp:iot:sensordata' seqnr='5'> <node nodeId='Device02'> <timestamp value='2013-03-07T19:31:15'> <numeric name='Temperature' momentary='true' automaticReadout='true' value='23.4' unit='°C'/> </timestamp> </node> </fields> </message>
- 13. MQ Telemetry Transport Killer protocol for M2M applications Connect everything with a central broker Content agnostic Simplicity is MQTT feature #1
- 14. MQ Telemetry Transport - a sensor pushes telemetry values on topics greenhouse/42/temperature greenhouse/42/humidity greenhouse/42/luminosity - actions are on another topic greenhouse/42/open-the-roof - payload format is free (json,binary,whatever..)
- 15. MQTT security - Username and password - TLS on top of the TCP stream
- 16. MQ Telemetry Transport @ Eclipse IoT Write your first MQTT application today :) Mosquitto lightweight broker Moquette Java based broker Paho clients Java, C/C++, Go, Python, Lua Ponte bridge MQTT, CoAP and HTTP Kura Java OSGi application framework
- 17. M2M: devices to a server Server Server
- 18. IoT: devices on Internet Internet
- 19. Web of things IP address for everything! 6LoWPAN on 802.15.4, Bluetooth LE Small IPv6 stack in battery powered devices Create mesh network with RPL (RFC 6550)
- 20. Web of things REST for everything! Sensor will live for decades Applications will evolve Things should expose dumb REST API, put the behaviour in mashup applications
- 21. Web of things
- 22. CoAP Constrained Application Protocol Internet Eng. Task Force standard for IoT Started around 2010! Final RFC 7252 published
- 23. CoAP Co: Constrained Simple to encode/decode: target 1$ 8bits MCU 100K Flash, 10K RAM
- 24. CoAP Co: Constrained HTTP and TCP are not a good fit, use UDP Low power networks
- 25. CoAP AP: Application Protocol RESTful protocol designed from scratch Transparent mapping to HTTP Additional features of M2M scenarios GET, POST, PUT, DELETE URIs and media types Deduplication Optional retransmissions Observation, SMS
- 26. CoAP Protocol structure Binary protocol ● Low parsing complexity ● Small message size Options ● Numbers with IANA registry ● Type-Length-Value ● Special option header marks payload if present
- 27. CoAP Discoverability Based on Web Linking (RFC5988) Extended to Core Link Format (RFC6690) GET /.well-known/core </config/groups>;rt="core.gp";ct=39, </sensors/temp>;rt="ucum.Cel";ct="0 50";obs, </large>;rt="block";sz=1280 ;title="Large resource" Decentralized discovery: Multicast Discovery Infrastructure-based: Resource Directories
- 28. CoAP Security Based on DTLS (TLS/SSL for Datagrams) Focus on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) ECDH, ECDSA, AES Hardware acceleration for IoT devices
- 29. Californium CoAP @ Eclipse IoT Pure Java library DTLS PSK/RPK/X509 Unconstrained: For large devices or cloud services http://eclipse.org/californium
- 31. IoT/M2M protocol security TLS for TCP (RFC 5246) DTLS for UDP (RFC 6347) Rolling your own is still not recommended :)
- 32. TLS/DTLS complexity? It’s customizable: X.509 certificate: certificate with chain of trust (CA & PKI) Raw-Public-key: only private/public key Pre-Shared-Key: symmetric keys without forward secrecy
- 33. TLS/DTLS complexity? Arduino Uno can run CoAP/MQTT But not in a secure way :( ROM/RAM cost estimation for (D)TLS: http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-lwig-tls-minimal-01.txt
- 34. (D)TLS Pre-Shared-Key mode +----------------------+-----------------+ | | DTLS | | +--------+--------+ | | ROM | RAM | +----------------------+--------+--------+ | State Machine | 8.15 | 1.9 | | Cryptography | 3.3 | 1.5 | | DTLS Record Layer | 3.7 | 0.5 | +----------------------+--------+--------+ | TOTAL | 15.15 | 3.9 | +----------------------+--------+--------+ Table 1: Memory Requirements in KB
- 35. (D)TLS Raw Public Key mode +----------------------------+---------------+ | Cryptographic functions | Code size | +----------------------------+---------------+ | MD5 | 4,856 bytes | | SHA1 | 2,432 bytes | | HMAC | 2,928 bytes | | RSA | 3,984 bytes | | Big Integer Implementation | 8,328 bytes | | AES | 7,096 bytes | | RC4 | 1,496 bytes | | Random Number Generator | 4,840 bytes | +----------------------------+---------------+
- 36. (D)TLS Raw certificate mode You need to add: ASN.1 parser X509 certificate check code Revocation?
- 37. TLS for embedded It’s still a challenge on some platform IETF DICE working group https://datatracker. ietf.org/wg/dice/ But weirdly TLS PSK is not used Certificate revocation is also a mess for IoT
- 38. Open-source DTLS implementation TinyDTLS: http://tinydtls.sourceforge.net MIT licensed embedded friendly Lua binding: https://github.com/sbernard31/luadtls Eclipse Californium Scandium: A Java implementation of DTLS https://github.com/eclipse/californium.scandium
- 39. More security challenges ;) Provisioning your key from the factory and pushing them on the server... ... for million of devices with different keys … and with the capability of changing the keys over-the-air
- 41. Device management Monitor, configure, secure, and update your devices All you need for operating a fleet of IoT devices Not tied to your application
- 42. Interoperability is the key You don't know yet what hardware will power your IoT projects on the field but you MUST be able to do management in a consistent way
- 43. D.M. protocols Usual suspects: TR-069 OMA-DM Lightweight M2M
- 44. TR-069 Bidirectional SOAP API for : broadband modems, gateway, set-top-boxes Configure, monitor, firmware upgrades. Yeah SOAP : HTTPS and XML :( Not wireless friendly
- 45. OMA-DM An Open Mobile Alliance standard for Device Management Targets mobile phone terminals but can be used for M2M Mean to be used by mobile network operators.
- 46. OMA-DM features Read, write configuration or monitoring nodes. Trigger remote commands (Exec) FUMO: Firmware Update Management Object SCOMO: Software Component Management Object
- 47. OMA-DM flaws Phone oriented HTTP+XML (or binary XML) not compact at all
- 48. OMA-DM flaws: Hello world :) <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <SyncML xmlns="SYNCML:SYNCML1.2"> <SyncHdr> <VerDTD>1.2</VerDTD> <VerProto>DM/1.2</VerProto> <SessionID>D101</SessionID> <MsgID>1</MsgID> <Target> <LocURI>http://na.airvantage.net</LocURI> </Target> <Source><LocURI>IMEI:1234567890</LocURI></Source> <Meta>
- 49. <MaxMsgSize>20480</MaxMsgSize> <MaxObjSize>512000</MaxObjSize> </Meta> </SyncHdr> <SyncBody> <Alert> <CmdID>1</CmdID> <Data>1201</Data> </Alert> <Replace> <CmdID>2</CmdID> <Item> <Source><LocURI>./DevInfo/DevId</LocURI></Source> <Data>IMEI:1234567890</Data> </Item>
- 50. <Item> <Source><LocURI>./DevInfo/Man</LocURI></Source> <Data>Sierra Wireless</Data> </Item> <Item> <Source><LocURI>./DevInfo/Mod</LocURI></Source> <Data>SL6087</Data> </Item> <Item> <Source><LocURI>./DevInfo/DmV</LocURI></Source> <Data>Sierra Wireless OMC v2.0</Data> </Item> <Item> <Source><LocURI>./DevInfo/Lang</LocURI></Source><Data>en</Data> </Item> </Replace> <Final /> </SyncBody> </SyncML>
- 51. OMA-DM: Helloworld server reply <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' standalone='no' ?> <SyncML xmlns="SYNCML:SYNCML1.2"> <SyncHdr><VerDTD>1.2</VerDTD><VerProto>DM/1.2</VerProto><SessionID>D101</SessionID> <MsgID>1</MsgID> <Target><LocURI>IMEI:1234567890</LocURI></Target> <Source><LocURI>http://na.airvantage.net</LocURI> <LocName>AIRVANTAGE-SERVER</LocName> </Source> </SyncHdr> <SyncBody> <Status> <CmdID>5</CmdID><MsgRef>1</MsgRef><CmdRef>0</CmdRef><Cmd>SyncHdr</Cmd> <Chal><Meta> <Format xmlns="syncml:metinf">b64</Format> <Type xmlns="syncml:metinf">syncml:auth-MAC</Type> XML QUOTA EXCEEDED..
- 52. OMA-DM security flaws Weak security (MD5-HMAC) on top of HTTP Use full HTTPS for higher grade security Complex to implement correctly, no streaming due to HMAC Unnecessary complex protocols is the safest way to security holes
- 53. OMA-DM But works :) Your mobile phone is managed using OMA-DM
- 54. OMA Lightweight M2M A reboot of OMA-DM but for M2M Built on top of CoAP REST API for device management
- 55. Lightweight M2M: API Security Device Server Connectivity monitoring Connectivity statistics Location Firmware The objects have a numerical identifier.
- 56. Lightweight M2M: URL /{object}/{instance}/{resource} Examples: "/6/0" the whole position object (binary record). "/6/0/2" only the altitude.
- 57. Lightweight M2M: API You can define your custom objects Published or not Structure is discovered using the CoAP link object format (RFC 6690)
- 58. Lightweight M2M: bootstrap Initial keying and configuration Well defined security lifecycle How to update credential and security scheme Keying from factory, smartcard, or over-the-air
- 59. Lightweight M2M: bootstrap Device can go out of factory with just BS credential When it goes live the BS server provisions the DM keys Future proof, and the BS server can be really robust
- 60. Eclipse Wakaama http://eclipse.org/wakaama A C library for implementing LWM2M Embedded friendly Lua binding for Wakaama: https://github.com/sbernard31/lualwm2m
- 61. More Lightweight M2M open source Leshan A Java implementation of LWM2M Server library based on Eclipse Californium Server UI http://github.com/jvermillard/leshan
- 63. Protocol convergence M2M/IoT is not a simple problem Security and provisioning are really the hardest ones Try hard to reduce the number of protocols to make your life easier!
- 64. Burning in IoT hell: Mixing protocols Cloud servers OMA-DM Radio module 2G/3G/LTE ZigBee/6LowPan WiFi, etc.. App1 Linux O/S Supervisor App2 App3 Low power App OMA-DM MQTT/CoAP Ad-hoc TR-069 Network Operator
- 65. LWM2M + CoAP LWM2M provide device management and security workflow for CoAP application using the same protocol! Huge simplicity and security win!
- 66. Key takeaways Break silos: embrace the web-of-things Think security first, it’s your biggest challenge Use standards for device management and keying CoAP + LWM2M for your next IoT application!
- 67. Thanks! Twitter: @vrmvrm E-mail: jvermillard@sierrawireless.com Creative Commons – Attribution (CC BY 3.0) Microchip designed by Nicolò Bertoncin from the Noun Project Cloud designed by James Fenton from the Noun Project Secure by Charlene Chen from The Noun Project Chat by Icomatic from The Noun Project Microchip designed by Mario Verduzco from the Noun Project Certificate designed by Charlene Chen from the Noun Project